📊 CYCLE · Case Study

How does an 85-person E&P close three acquisitions in twelve months at half the typical IT cost?

How an 85-person Calgary E&P closed three acquisitions in twelve months, integrated each one in well under two months, and spent roughly half of the IT-integration cost typical for unprepared operators.

For: Operators with consolidation ambition (80-200 people)

Case Study · Operators · Three Deals, One Window

Three deals.
One eighteen-month window.

How an 85-person Calgary E&P closed three acquisitions in twelve months, integrated each one in well under two months, and spent roughly half of the IT-integration cost typical for unprepared operators.

Composite case study - This is a composite case study drawn from multiple actual Vencer Group engagements with Canadian oil and gas operators of similar profile. Names, specific identifying details, and exact metrics have been altered or generalized to protect client confidentiality. The patterns described, the work delivered, and the outcomes documented are representative of what Vencer has built across 19 years and 30+ M&A transactions in the Canadian energy mid-market.

FOR: Operators · 80–200 people · multi-deal consolidation window

Quick answer

An 85-person Calgary E&P operator closed three acquisitions in twelve months, integrated each one in well under two months, and spent roughly half the IT-integration cost typical for unprepared operators. The eighteen-month window was the consolidation opportunity; the readiness was the work that came before. The acquirer grew from 85 to 147 people without an IT crisis.

Operator type
Operators
Scale
85 → 147 people
Operational reality
Mixed
Engagement
Bundled · Professional
01

A Calgary E&P with three deals on the table.

85 people. 165 wells across Montney and Duvernay positions. A founder-led E&P that had grown four times over during the 2021–2024 upcycle, with three acquisitions in negotiation simultaneously when WTI dipped through $75 in mid-2024.

The client called us in the second quarter of 2024. They had three acquisition targets in front of them at the same time, all of them privately-held Montney operators in the 20 to 35 person range. The combined transaction value was approaching $340 million CAD. One of the three targets came with a complication: a joint venture position with a US operator that brought its own data residency requirements, its own reporting cadence, and its own counterparty expectations on cyber and audit. Not a deal-breaker, but a wrinkle the diligence team would need to handle cleanly. The CEO knew the cycle was working in his favor - sellers were getting cautious as WTI softened, and his cash position was strong - but he also knew that closing three deals in twelve months, including one with cross-border exposure, would test every operational system the company had.

The CFO had a different concern. Call him Mark, though he could have been any of the CFOs we have worked with in this profile. Mark had been the controller of this same company during the 2014 downcycle, and the CFO through the 2020 one. He had earned the kind of risk aversion you only get from being in the room when things actually went wrong. He had also been through the company’s 2019 acquisition, which had taken eight months to fully integrate and had cost roughly $1.8 million CAD in unplanned cleanup work. The thought of doing that three times in eighteen months was, in his words, “not a great way to spend a year.”

Their current IT setup was the kind of Mixed environment we see often in growing E&Ps at this scale: Microsoft 365 for email and documents, an aging file server in the office holding seismic and engineering data, a regional accounting platform that had outgrown its sweet spot two acquisitions ago, and a part-time IT generalist who knew where everything was but had no formal documentation. The company had grown through the upcycle by being smart and lucky. Mark was no longer sure they could keep being lucky.

02

Three deals, twelve months, no playbook.

When we walked into their environment in late Q2 2024 for a structured assessment, four specific problems surfaced. Each one would have been manageable on its own. Together they represented a gap that would compound across all three deals:

  • Nobody had written down what they actually had. The IT generalist could describe what existed if you asked him, but there were no diagrams, no runbooks, no inventory. Every acquisition diligence would require building that picture from scratch - both for the company and for whichever target was next.
  • Their Microsoft 365 setup was built for the founders, not for 150 people. The structure inside the system had grown organically. Too many people had top-level administrator access. There were no rules in place to manage what happens when 60 new people from three acquisitions all needed to be added at once.
  • The accounting platform was at the end of its useful life for their scale. It could not cleanly consolidate three additional entities. The data flows the acquisitions would need to run during integration were not something that platform supported.
  • Their cyber setup was about to fall below what their insurance carrier was going to require. The 2024 policy renewal was sixty days out. Early signals from the broker suggested the carrier would ask for additional controls before renewing. Failing the renewal during active deal-making would be a strategic problem - not just because the coverage mattered, but because losing coverage mid-deal would signal something to the sellers.

Mark’s actual question to us was: “Can we do this without it becoming the only thing the senior team works on for the next eighteen months?”

Why this matters
M&A capability is built before it is needed, not during.

The operators who handle M&A IT well typically spend 1.5% to 3% of transaction value on the IT side of integration. The operators who handle it badly spend 4% to 8% - and the difference shows up directly in the deal multiple they capture. Bain & Company’s 2026 oil and gas M&A report names clean data rooms and clean IT integration as one of the top three variables separating transactions that close at 6.9× multiples from transactions that close at 4×.

For a three-deal program with combined transaction value near $340M CAD, the cost difference between 1.5% and 5% integration spend is roughly $12M CAD. That is what Mark was actually trying to avoid - not the abstract risk, but the very real expense of doing it badly across three deals in a row.

03

A Bundled engagement, structured in three layers.

Vencer entered the engagement at the Professional tier of our Bundled model - meaning we became the IT department, working alongside the existing IT generalist who stayed on through the engagement and eventually took a business-systems role inside the company. The work was structured in three layers, sequenced so each one built the foundation the next one needed.

Layer 1 - foundation work (months 0–3, before the first deal closed).

Before any acquisition closed, we needed to build the integration capability that all three deals would draw on. The work in this layer was unglamorous and high-leverage:

  • We wrote down what existed. A 47-page document covering every system, every data flow, every vendor relationship, and who had access to what. Boring work. Critical work. The IT generalist contributed most of the knowledge; we did most of the writing. By the end of the document, both Mark and the CEO could answer any question about their own environment without having to call the generalist.
  • We rebuilt the Microsoft 365 setup for what the company was becoming. We reduced the number of people with top-level administrator access from seven down to three - because seven was too many, and we had seen what happens when one of those accounts gets compromised. We rebuilt the way groups and permissions were organized so it matched how the company actually worked. We put rules in place that would survive the arrival of 60 new people from three acquisitions.
  • We migrated the accounting platform to PakEnergy. A three-month implementation, completed before the first deal closed. The timing was deliberate: we did not want the new accounting platform to become a project that had to happen during an acquisition integration. By doing it first, the new platform became the destination that the three acquired entities would consolidate into.
  • We lifted their cyber setup to where the insurance carrier was going to want it. The basics: enforced multi-factor authentication across the entire company (the requirement to confirm a sign-in with a code from a phone or app), real 24/7 monitoring through our Singapore and Calgary operations, modern endpoint protection from SentinelOne, and email phishing protection from Proofpoint - both 2025 Gartner Magic Quadrant Leaders. The cyber insurance renewal at month four came back with a small premium increase against a market backdrop where similar operators were seeing 22% to 38%.

Layer 2 - the three integrations (months 4 through 15).

Each acquisition followed the same playbook, refined deal-to-deal. The playbook had nine workstreams: looking at the seller’s data, moving their people into the buyer’s identity system, consolidating accounting onto one platform, switching over communications, lifting the seller’s cyber setup to match the buyer’s, consolidating vendors, transferring knowledge from the seller’s team, keeping regulatory reporting unbroken, and a 90-day post-close monitoring window. Each workstream had a named owner on our side and a named counterpart on the client side.

Month 4 · Deal 1 closes
22-person Montney operator. The first integration ran roughly 50 days from announcement to operational consolidation. It was not the fastest of the three - that came later - but it set the playbook the other two would follow. There was one moment, during the data review at week three, where we found that the seller’s production data had been stored in a folder structure that nobody on either side had documented. We caught it in time. Had we found it three weeks later, during the regulatory reporting cutover, it would have cost the company a missed reporting deadline.
Month 8 · Deal 2 closes
31-person Duvernay operator - the one with the US joint venture. Roughly 52 days from announcement to operational consolidation, slightly longer than Deal 1 because of the cross-border data flow that had to be untangled cleanly. The seller had run their accounting on a different platform (WolfePak), which required extra work to translate the data into the buyer’s PakEnergy system. The translation took an additional week and surfaced a discrepancy in how the two companies were tracking joint-venture costs - including some of the JV positions on the US side. The discrepancy was real and material - we documented it, surfaced it to Mark, and adjusted the integration accounting so it would not propagate into the consolidated financials. That kind of finding is exactly why we recommend running integration with someone who has done it before, especially when there is cross-border exposure in the mix.
Month 13 · Deal 3 closes
29-person Montney operator. Roughly 40 days from announcement to operational consolidation - the fastest of the three. Some of the speed came from a clean seller environment. Most of it came from a playbook that had now been run twice. The third deal was the one where Mark told us he stopped worrying about whether the integration would work.
Month 18 · Stable state
147 people across the combined entity. 410 producing wells. One Microsoft 365 setup. One PakEnergy installation. One cyber posture that met all the carrier’s requirements with room to spare. One IT operating model, one set of vendor relationships, one runbook.

Layer 3 - knowledge transfer and operating model (continuous).

Throughout the engagement, we worked under the rule that the client’s team should always know what we were doing, why we were doing it, and how to verify the work independently. Monthly reporting. Quarterly business reviews. Named engineers who stayed on the account through all three deals. Vencer was the IT department. The client’s team owned the strategic direction. The IT generalist who had been there before us did not lose his job - he moved into a business-systems role that played to his strengths and freed him from the parts of the work that had been making him miserable.

04

Three deals closed. The senior team kept doing their actual jobs.

Integration cost
~2.1%
of combined transaction value, spent on IT integration across all three deals. The unprepared range is 4% to 8%. On a $340M program, the difference is roughly $12M.
Integration speed
40–52 days
from announcement to operational consolidation per deal. The client’s 2019 baseline for a single similar-sized acquisition was eight months.
Cyber renewal
single-digit
premium increase at renewal, against a market backdrop where similar operators saw 22% to 38% increases in 2024.

Before and after.

Before (Q1 2024)
85 people. 165 wells. No documented IT baseline. M365 setup built for the founders. Accounting platform at end of life. Cyber setup below what the carrier was about to require. Part-time IT generalist as the only person who knew where things were. 2019 acquisition required 8 months and $1.8M of unplanned IT cleanup work to integrate.
After (Q4 2025)
147 people. 410 wells. Three acquisitions integrated. One M365 setup, one accounting platform, one cyber posture, one playbook. Each integration ran faster than the one before it. The senior team did their actual jobs. The IT capability built during the program now reduces the cost of every future deal.

The moment it mattered.

Six weeks after the first deal closed, the company received notice of an environmental regulator review that required production data going back five years - from both the original entity and the newly-acquired operator. The data was on three different systems. Under the old setup, the company would have spent two to three weeks just locating it.

Because the integration playbook had included regulatory data continuity as one of the nine workstreams, the data was already consolidated, formatted, and findable. The review was responded to in eleven business days. No extensions requested. The regulatory officer mentioned, in passing, that it was the cleanest response he had seen that quarter.

In the Q1 2025 business review, this was the incident Mark kept coming back to. Not because it had been dramatic - it had not - but because it was the moment he realized the integration work had paid for itself before the second deal even closed.

What this generalizes to
Growing E&Ps with M&A intent should build IT capability before the first deal, not during it.

The architectural decisions covered in Chapter 8 of The Operating System - the accounting platform, the data architecture, the identity foundation, the operational technology boundary, and the M&A capability itself - have their highest return on investment when made at the 80-person stage, before the company is actively executing transactions. The same decisions made under deal pressure cost two to four times as much and produce inferior results.

For Growing E&Ps that intend to be the consolidator rather than the consolidated, the Bundled engagement model is typically the right structure - not because the work could not theoretically be done internally, but because the opportunity cost of pulling the senior team off operations to run an IT transformation is consistently higher than the cost of partnering with a firm that has run the playbook before.

Next step

Does this story sound familiar?

The pattern in this case study has played out across dozens of Canadian oil and gas companies in the 10 to 100 person range. If you recognize parts of it in your own operation - or you suspect you might - the next step is a structured conversation with a Vencer engineer.

The IT-and-the-Cycle Assessment is a 3 to 5 day structured review of your specific operational situation. We pressure-test where your IT stands today, where it needs to be for what you intend to become, and what one bad day looks like at current state. You leave with a written report, a 90-day plan, and named owners. No hype. No vendor pitch. Just the truth about where you are and what to do next.

For a faster diagnostic, three free tools at vencergroup.com cover the same territory in less time: the Hidden IT Cost Calculator (12 minutes, quantifies your IT cost burden across three price-cycle scenarios), the Cyber Risk Self-Score (5 minutes, scores your cyber baseline against 12 critical controls), and the IT Myth-Buster sheet (the seven objections you’ll hear from inside your own company and how to think about them).

Vencer operates from Calgary headquarters with delivery teams across four continents. For Canadian-headquartered operators with international exposure - whether that means US basin extension, international service contracts, cross-border M&A, or international counterparties with their own cyber and audit requirements - the cross-border operational capability is built in, not bolted on.

In Business
19 years
Through two oil and gas cycle turns. Calgary-headquartered. Built for the Canadian energy mid-market.
M&A Transactions
30+ deals
IT integration delivered on 30+ acquisitions representing over $12B CAD in transaction value.
Managed Security
Zero breaches
Across 11 years of managed security operations. Four continents of delivery.
Office
700 4 Ave SW #1680
Calgary, AB T2P 3J4
Phone · Email
+1 (888) 271-6230
insights@vencergroup.com
Web
vencergroup.com
Their story. Not yours.

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